cises is that over the past couple of years, structural variables -above all, potential output growth and the output gap derived from it, as well as the non-accelerating infl ation rate of unemployment (NAIRU) -have gradually become indispensable tools for judging the economic and fi scal policy stances in Europe. Moreover, if anything, their importance will continue to grow in the years to come with the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union ("the Fiscal Compact") that is currently undergoing ratifi cation in the eurozone and a number of non-euro EU countries.
A quick look into the mechanisms established with the balanced budget rule (debt brake) in Germany highlights the signifi cance that those potential variables have taken on. This rule serves as a role model for similar rules to be implemented -preferably with constitutional rank -by EU member states that ratify the fi scal compact. 3 The German budgetary rule limits structural net new borrowing by the federal government to 0.35 per cent of GDP from 2016 onwards, while states (Länder) and municipalities have to achieve balanced budgets by 2020. In addition, it allows for a cyclical component of net borrowing that varies with the state of the economy: it requires public budgets to record a cyclical surplus in upswings, while providing leeway for new net borrowing in excess of 0.35 per cent of GDP in downturns.
3 A detailed description of the German federal budget rule is available from the German Federal Ministry of Finance website in German (www. bundesfi nanzministerium.de/Content/DE/Standardartikel/Themen/ Oeffentliche_Finanzen/Schuldenbremse/2012-06-14-kompendiumdt.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=3) and English (www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Content/DE/Standardartikel/Themen/Oeffentliche_Finanzen/Schuldenbremse/2012-06-14-kompendium-en.pdf?__ blob=publicationFile&v=2).
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Potential Economic Variables and Actual Economic Policies in Europe
Ignoring for a moment the debate on whether balanced budget rules are a sensible idea from a macroeconomic point of view, there remains a major problem with tying one's fi scal policy to econometric estimates of potential variables: their notorious unreliability. With every one of its biannual economic forecasts, the EC provides revised estimates of structural parameters that are crucial components of its macroeconometric models and, by extension, its economic policy advice. This article shows that the EC's econometric estimates of potential growth variables in Europe have been subject to massive revisions since the fi nancial crisis.
Economic Forecasting
Key to isolating and quantifying the cyclical component is the estimation of the economy's (unobservable) potential output, which is calculated using the EC's production function methodology. A production function relates the economy's output (GDP) to two broadly aggregated inputs, capital and labour. Potential output grows with input factor increases and/or with the augmentation of factor productivity. Potential GDP is the size of economic output that would be achieved at normal levels of utilisation of the available factors of production, that is, the economy's capital stock and labour force. The difference between potential and actual GDP is called the output gap and is usually expressed as a percentage of potential GDP. If actual output is below calculated potential output, the output gap is negative; if actual output exceeds potential output, it is positive.
To get from the output gap to the cyclical component, the former, which econometric models yield in real economic terms, is fi rst assumed to be identical in nominal terms (since all budgetary planning has to be done in current euros) and then multiplied by the so-called budget sensitivity. value is derived from calculations of elasticities with respect to cyclical fl uctuations in economic activity for four public sector income categories (corporate, personal and indirect taxes, social security contributions) and one expenditure category (unemployment-related social benefi ts).
To get a feeling for the magnitudes involved, assume that the German economy's output gap for 2014 were estimated at one per cent, signalling an overutilisation of the available factors of production. The required 2014 cyclical public surplus would then be 0.51 (1.0 * 0.51) per cent of potential German GDP, which comes to around €14 bn. If, conversely, there is a negative output gap of one per cent, the budgetary rule would allow for countercyclical new net public borrowing of €14 bn.
The unfortunate unreliability of econometric potential variable estimations
Ignoring for a moment the entire debate on whether balanced budget rules are a sensible idea from a macroeconomic point of view, there remains a major problem with tying one's fi scal policy to econometric estimates of potential variables: their notorious unreliability. Even one and the same institution, such as the EC, revises its past estimates with every new forecast as new or revised data become available and as estimation methods are adjusted.
The fi gures that follow exemplarily illustrate the size of output gap revisions over time. Figures 1a and 1b 
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The evolution of output gap estimates over time depicted in Figure 1a , however, shows that countercyclical fi scal policy in Germany relying on the real-time estimate of potential GDP would have been too timid, given that in hindsight, the negative output gap in 2005 is considered to have been almost twice as big as was projected at the time (-1.2 versus -2.2 per cent, according to the latest EC estimate). The contrast is even more striking in the case of Spain, where the economy recorded a negative output gap of 2.5 per cent according to calculations at the time, but is now considered instead to have been in a state of overutilisation ( Figure 1b) . The cyclical component in a fi scal rule, had it been in place then, would have been off by one percentage point of potential GDP in Germany and well over three percentage points in Spain. Working in the background here is a major and ongoing downward revision of Spanish growth potential in the EC's post-crisis estimates, which is considered in more detail in the next section.
Unexplained effects of the fi nancial and economic crisis on potential variables
Applying the above estimation procedures to the eurozone economy, the EC predicts in its 2012 forecasts that the overall fi scal policy stance in 2013 will be basically neutral. In other words, the EC deems the major fi scal consolidation that governments -not only in the imminent crisis countries but the entire eurozone -are currently engaged in as not necessarily contractionary. The current European Economy publication accompanying the latest EC forecast exercise casts doubt on the recent IMF Economic Outlook fi ndings of a fi scal multiplier larger than one. 6 This is rather remarkable, seeing as the very same autumn forecast undertakes the next in a series of substantial downward revisions of expected real GDP growth in the European crisis countries.
Comparing the current forecast with that from just six months earlier -an exercise more demanding than hitherto, as the standard overview 
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what exactly -if not systematic underestimation of negative fi scal multiplier effects -is behind those enormous revisions.
Regarding the mechanics behind the Commission's take on the fi scal policy stance, it is necessary to look a little closer at recent revisions in potential growth estimates. First, conventional macroeconomic theory suggests that potential variables should be relatively stable over short-to medium-term horizons, the rationale being that their main determinants are largely independent of business cycles. Even large swings in net investment (fl ows) will not quickly affect the economy's productive capital stock, and cyclical unemployment is -again according to standard economic theory -a transitory phenomenon that will not affect the longer-run equilibrium unemployment, which is structural in nature. This is the (Walrasian) general equilibrium paradigm, which underlies the new classical/new Keynesian synthesis model of the macro economy. Its longer-run growth path is determined by supply-side factors, in particular capital accumulation, productivity and demographic developments affecting the available labour force. This potential path is, for all practical purposes, independent of cyclical, short-run fl uctuations in economic activity that arise from various "imperfections" or "frictions". Prolonged periods of (demanddriven) over-or underutilisation of economic resources are deemed impossible, because they would have to result in either accelerating infl ation or defl ation respectively.
In stark contrast to the requirements of macroeconomic theory, however, the EC's econometric estimates of potential growth variables in Europe have been subject to massive revisions since the fi nancial and economic crisis. As early as 2010, Cohen-Setton and Valla have pointed to substantial revisions. 7 Since then, new EC forecasts have ever continued to add to previous revisions, particularly in the crisis countries of the European periphery.
Looking at the calculations for Spain, one can observe a downward revision of the EC's potential GDP growth rates that goes back to 2003 and becomes particularly pronounced in the years following the Great Recession. The picture in fact looks even worse for a country like Ireland, which has been the poster child for fi scal austerity among the euro crisis countries. As of autumn 2012, the EC is estimating potential growth in Ireland to have been as many as three percentage points lower than previously thought -but in this case already in the pre-crisis years up to 2008 (see Figure 3b ). 
The documentation of the EC's forecasts on its CIRCA website also allows for a decomposition of potential growth revisions into the contributions of labour, capital and total factor productivity. Performing this decomposition reveals that in the crisis countries in particular, revisions are largely driven by a decrease of labour inputs. These account for about two-thirds of the decrease in potential growth estimates in both Ireland and Spain. Now, recall that according to economic theory, potential growth estimates are supposed to refl ect structural (supplyside) economic effects. With regard to labour, such supply-side factors are changes in the size of the labour force, changes in participation rates and/or trend changes in average hours worked per employee. Looking at the data provided by the EC, however, none of these factors is driving the decrease in labour inputs. Rather, it is very clear that unemployment is the key factor (see Figures 4a and 4b ). If this unemployment was cyclical in nature, however, it could not be infl uencing the economy's potential growth. Accordingly, the increasing unemployment must be structural in nature. In macroeconom(etr)ic terms, the NAIRU, i.e. the unemployment rate required to keep infl ation stable, must have risen substantially.
Indeed, this is precisely what the EC country tables report: again comparing the spring 2008 and autumn 2012 forecasts, the NAIRU in Spain is no less than 12 percentage points higher than previously estimated, while the 2008 realtime estimate has been revised up by over four percentage points (see Figure 5a ). The corresponding estimates for 2012 are 8.2 points higher in Ireland (see Figure 5b ), 6.8 points in Greece and 5.6 points in Portugal.
At this point it should be becoming clear how the EC's forecasting exercises can yield a neutral fi scal policy stance for the eurozone in 2013: massive downward revisions of potential growth for consecutive years, to signifi cant degrees due to presumed major increases in the NAIRU, lead to a much-reduced potential GDP, against which actual GDP is then compared to yield the respective output gaps. In other words, the further NAIRU estimates are revised up and potential growth estimates are revised down, the more quickly crisis-induced negative output gaps disappear, rendering expansionary fi scal policy unnecessary at best and potentially harmful. 
Ireland is a good example to illustrate this effect: with negative potential growth rates in 2012 as well as the three previous years (see Figure 3b) , even modest actual growth, such as the Irish economy recorded last year and is currently projected to realise this and next year, are suffi cient to quickly reach the point of "overutilisation". Thus, the Irish output gap shrinks to -0.5 per cent next year and turns positive (0.8 per cent) in 2014.
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It is important to highlight again at this point that conventional economic theory sees unemployment in the medium to longer run as independent of short-run cyclical events. This is despite the fact that studies on "hysteresis" in the labour market (i.e. effects that reduce the probability for the jobless to regain employment with the increasing duration of their unemployment spell) have detailed numerous routes through which actual unemployment may become structural if it is allowed to persist for longer periods of time. Still, the majority view is that the NAIRU is an exogenous variable that is determined almost exclusively by structural labour mar-ket parameters (level and duration of unemployment benefi ts, union density, degree of employment protection, etc.) which are considered to affect the wage-setting process.
10 Accordingly, when the policy debate touches on structural reforms which are meant to raise the medium-term growth perspectives, this is where the focus of attention lies.
The essential problem with the labour market-based story is that there simply is no evidence of structural deterioration that would even come close to explaining the kind of massive NAIRU increases reported above. Looking at Ireland, for example, it would appear extremely diffi cult to explain how a country with labour market institutions arguably corresponding the closest to the textbook ideal -with post-crisis wage agreements in fact producing substantial nominal wage cuts for four consecutive years (2009 through 2012, the latter according to the EC forecast) and with cuts in unemployment benefi ts and the minimum wage level -should see its NAIRU rising from just over four per cent in 2007 to 14 per cent in 2012. In fact, the EC, in its latest forecast, is projecting the Irish NAIRU to continue to climb through 2017, when it is expected to reach 15.9 per cent.
Unsurprisingly, then, the EC's European Economy publications are by and large silent on the causes of the massive NAIRU increases that are driving its econometric model results. There is, of course, some mention of the problems involving the reallocation of labour from collapsing construction sectors to other sectors of the economy in the countries affected by defl ating real estate bubbles (Spain and Ireland). 11 Apart from that, however, there are a number of rather general, unspecifi c statements pointing to the experiences of past fi nancial crises, which were found to lower potential growth for extended periods of time.
Regarding the ongoing and intensifying unemployment debacle in Europe, there is an alternative viewpoint held by a minority of economists who maintain that cyclical events, and the evolution of capital investment in particular, have a large impact not just on short-run but also on longer-run un-10 Studies on the impact of oligopolistic product market structures affecting the price-setting process (mark-ups of prices over costs), which is the second factor in the mainstream labour market model, are much less common. 11 The EC itself, however, qualifi es this effect in its Autumn 2009 European Economy publication (pp. 44-45), which presents results of regressing actual unemployment and the NAIRU on diverging sectoral employment patterns. It fi nds rather substantial effects of dispersion in sectoral employment on unemployment but very minor effects on the NAIRU. Moreover, if sectoral reallocation was found to be the major problem, the conclusion for economic policy advice would be to prop up investment in measures improving the matching process, above all training/re-training and other active labour market policies. Currently propagated policies of fi scal retrenchment, however, would appear to have the exact opposite effect, particularly in immediate crisis countries. Figure 6 illustrates the correlation of (rates of change of) gross fi xed capital investment and employment, measured in total hours worked, where changes in investment are leading changes in the volume of employment.
For proponents of this alternative view, the (rough) line of causation runs from a demand-induced collapse in investment during the 2008/2009 crisis to massive reductions in hours worked that resulted in sharp rises of unemployment rates in countries where there was no internal (workingtime) fl exibility -arguably the single most important factor in dealing with the crisis in Germany. 13 With expected aggregate demand remaining sluggish over the following years as private actors (both households and fi rms) began repairing their balance sheets, investment never picked up and indeed continued to shrink in the European peripheral countries most affected by the current eurozone crisis, allowing for no respite in the labour market.
Currently, the econometric models used by the EC invariably produce estimates of a rising NAIRU, since actual unemployment is rising, whereas wages and particularly prices refuse to fall in tandem. Again, substantiated economic explanations of this technically required rise are so far largely missing. If, however, one looks at volumes of investment and the evolution of the NAIRU in a comparison of pre-and postcrisis EC forecasts, the alternative view of collapsing capital accumulation driving unemployment and, in consequence, the NAIRU does not look so far-fetched.
12 See E. S t o c k h a m m e r, E. K l ä r : Capital Accumulation, Labour
Market Institutions, and Unemployment in the Medium Run, in: Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol. 35, No. 2, 2011, pp. 437-457 , as well as references therein. 13 See e.g. A. H e r z o g -S t e i n , F. L i n d n e r, S. S t u r n , T. v a n Tr e e c k :
From a source of weakness to a tower of strength? The changing German labour market, IMK Report 56, November 2010.
Note that the leading nature of investment shares is substantially obscured in these fi gures by the fact that the EC has effectively "smoothed" its massive upward revisions in the NAIRU by also retroactively adjusting it for past years going back as far as 2004, as Figures 7a and 7b reveal quite clearly.
The drop in investment activity and the concomitant increases in unemployment and estimated NAIRU are not restricted to the euro area crisis countries, as an exemplary look at the corresponding fi gures for Denmark (Figure 8a ) and the UK (Figure 8b ) reveals. In the EC's "fl exicurity" role model economy, Denmark, a four percentage point drop in the share of investment to (potential) GDP since the onset of the crisis came with an increase in the NAIRU from 3.5 per cent (the real-time estimate for 2008) to 5.9 per cent in 2012 (climbing further to 6.4 per cent by 2016 according to the current EC projection).
In the UK, during the same period, the drop in investment amounted to about 3.5 percentage points, and the (unsmoothed) NAIRU rose from 5.1 to 7.3 per cent (projected to rise above eight per cent in the coming years).
Conclusions: macroeconomic policy advice based on questionable econometric results
An independent observer looking at Europe at the moment would arguably consider unemployment the biggest and most pressing problem on the continent. Across all 27 European Union member states, unemployment has increased by about 50 per cent since the onset of the crisis and currently stands at close to 26 million. Youth unemployment exceeds 50 per cent in Spain and Greece and has reached intolerable levels in many other European countries.
In truth, priorities appear to be quite different. The most important challenge facing the EC, and national political leaders in euro area member states in particular, is impressing fi nancial markets with efforts at fi scal consolidation that it is hoped will prevent interest rates on government debt from rising any further. The EC is not openly acknowledging the apparent problem that this path of fi scal consolidation, coming at a time when demand from the private sector is weakened by efforts to reduce debt-to-income levels, is unlikely to produce a climate where investment fl ourishes. Instead, via its growth forecasts and potential output estimates, it is effectively declaring unused factors of production unusable.
In policy debates, it should be made very clear that this is precisely what the reported major potential growth and NAI-RU revisions signal: that the economy simply cannot grow faster, unemployment cannot be substantially reduced except through structural reforms (the effects of which will not materialise for several years), and attempts to alleviate the Economic Forecasting burden through fi scal policy tools aimed at boosting aggregate demand will be useless and only serve to further raise already high public debt levels.
There is ample reason to be sceptical of such conclusions. The fact that they are based on econometric forecasting exercises relying on a theoretical model that essentially considers short-run fl uctuations in economic activity irrelevant for the longer-run growth outlook is arguably the most important one. Back in 2008, US Nobel laureate Robert Solow testifi ed in front of the US House of Representatives Committee on Science and Technology, criticising that the mainstream general equilibrium model "has no real room for unemployment of the kind we see most of the time, and especially now: unemployment that is pure waste. There are competent workers, willing to work at the prevailing wage or even a bit less, but the potential job is stymied by a market failure. The economy is unable to organize a win-win situation that is apparently there for the taking." 14 14 Note that when economists speak of "waste" in relation to unemployment, what is generally meant is the loss in terms of goods that could be produced or services that could be rendered under full employment. The true social costs of unemployment obviously extend far beyond that.
The urgent question warranting more discussion in Europe, then, is clearly: How much of the unemployment that we see is in fact total waste, and what could be done to reduce it? Obviously, it cannot be in anybody's interest to replace unsustainable private sector debt dynamics with unsustainable public sector debt dynamics. Pro-cyclical fi scal consolidation in the current situation, however, is very likely producing exactly the kind of waste that Solow laments -a fact that policy makers in Europe had realised during the 2008/9 crisis, one that has long been apparent in Greece, and one that is now becoming increasingly evident in Spain and elsewhere in the euro area.
Economists relying on estimations of potential variables for their take on macroeconomic developments also have questions to address. Given that these estimates are regularly and substantially revised even in normal economic times, the very least one should be able to expect is for policy advice based primarily on those estimates to be handed out with utmost caution. Declaring unused resources unusable, as recent EC forecasts effectively do, should not be something that is accepted at face value. Rather, the scope of revisions that are evident with respect to potential variable estimations clearly warrant the question whether something might be signifi cantly wrong with the underlying theory. 
